Barrier to Democracy: Corruption in Former Soviet Eastern Europe by Schubarth, Lydia
A Barrier to Democracy: 
Corruption in Former Soviet 
Eastern Europe
Lydia Schubarth. 
Faculty mentor: Ryan Salzman
International Studies
Lydia Schubarth
Lydia Schubarth is currently a senior at 
Northern Kentucky University and will 
graduate in May 2020. She is working towards 
a Bachelor of Arts degree in international 
studies with minors in political science, history, 
and European studies. After graduation, she 
hopes to obtain a Master’s degree in security 
or conflict resolution. Lydia is enthusiastic 
about this opportunity and thanks her faculty 
mentor, Dr. Ryan Salzman, for his help and 
guidance on this project over the past year.
Abstract 
One of the difficulties that a country faces when working toward democratization 
is the corruption that may run rampant in their government. This paper will analyze 
corruption in government and how it affects democracy, particularly in four of 
the former Soviet Union countries that are located in Eastern Europe: Moldova, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. Qualitative and quantitative analysis is provided 
regarding each of the four former Soviet Union countries listed. By using the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores given by Transparency International, 
the countries are compared and contrasted in order to examine how their 
corruption has changed over time and how their situations and governments 
have affected their level of corruption. Scores given to each of the countries by 
Freedom House are also used to compare democracy. CPI and Freedom House 
scores are used in conjunction to analyze the relationship between corruption 
and democracy and to locate a correlation between the two. After analysis of the 
democracy and levels of corruption in each country in the study and seeing the 
correlation, it is clear that democracy and corruption affect each other.
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Introduction
When a country is striving toward democracy, one of the 
biggest issues is the possibility of corrupt officials holding 
positions of power. According to the website Transparency 
International, corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty, and 
political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the 
sector where it occurs” (Corruptions Perceptions Index, 2017). 
Due to the large impacts that corruption can have on a 
newly-established or even a well-maintained democracy, it 
is important to understand those impacts, the relationship 
between corruption and democracy, and how countries can 
move away from corrupt practices. The problems are especially 
evident in post-Soviet Union Eastern Europe. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the former Soviet countries were left on their own. As 
a result, corruption that became commonplace during the 
time of the Soviet Union not only continued, but flourished. 
This paper will analyze the relationship between corruption 
and democracy in general and specifically regarding four 
post-Soviet Union Eastern European countries: the Republic 
of Moldova, Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus, and Georgia. 
Qualitative and quantitative evidence will illuminate the 
relationship between corruption and democracy in the case 
studies those countries. 
Literature Review
There is no government that has not experienced some degree 
of corruption, but the scope of corruption varies between 
different countries. 
Charron and Bagenholm (2016) claim that corruption not only 
results in mistrust of politicians and disbelief in the claims 
or promises that they put forth, but also other undesirable 
consequences. They state that some of these undesirable 
consequences are less economic development within the 
country, more inequality—both based on demographics and 
income inequality—poor health outcomes and environmental 
conditions, and less trust in the government, which in turn 
affects the morale of the people and creates a less happy 
population. They go on to explain that when citizens feel as if 
their government is not listening to them, they are less likely 
to be happy with the governmental structure and the system 
as a whole. 
Democracy can be corroded away—a basis of democracy is 
the concept of politicians representing citizens, and when they 
are not doing that, it takes away the essence of democracy. 
According to Diamond (2008), there are few things that will 
erode away trust in government as quickly and effectively as 
corruption will, and citizens should expect their representatives 
in government to abide by the same laws and rules that the 
citizens must.
There are many essential parts of a democracy, some of which 
concern corruption. According to Charron and Bagenholm 
(2016), one of these most central parts is electoral accountability, 
which operates by punishing politicians that are clearly corrupt 
and behaving inappropriately in their position of power, and 
by rewarding those politicians that don’t misuse the power that 
they have obtained. Charron and Bagenholm explain that by 
voting out the politicians that are not in line with the interests 
of the citizens or that demonstrate corrupt motivations, people 
are able to clearly show their government officials that they 
do not support their behavior and refuse to accept failure, 
mismanagement, and criminal activities engaged in by their 
representatives. 
Thoughts by Diamond (2008) demonstrate the expectation 
that the citizens in a democracy place on their government 
officials and representatives to follow the laws that all of the 
citizens have to follow and to represent the citizens’ interests 
in government to the best of their ability. When it is proven 
that officials are corrupt and are not doing that, it prevents 
citizens from trusting in those people—or perhaps the system 
of government—in the future.
According to Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig (2006), 
democratic institutions are important in order to prevent 
corrupt authoritarian leaders from taking over. But if there are 
already corrupt authoritarian leaders in the government, it is 
nearly impossible to establish and maintain these democratic 
institutions in order for them to do their job; they need to 
be implemented before those corrupt officials have gained 
power. They argue that democracy doesn’t only decrease the 
level of corruption that is within a government, but democracy 
also affects the nature of the corruption. They support their 
argument by saying that because citizens in a democracy hold 
power, they are able to vote politicians out, and therefore the 
level of corruption decreases. Politicians may not act corruptly 
not because they are concerned for the well-being of their 
country and government, but because they are worried about 
holding their jobs and keeping the power—however minimal 
it may be—that they possess. However, the authors make the 
point that in cases of corruption that may have very minimal 
consequences, such as nepotism or small bribes, corruption 
in the democracy may be unabated due to the benefits 
outweighing the minor political costs that may come as a result. 
The position taken by Drury, Krieckhaus, and Lusztig (2006) 
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seem to be supported by Rose-Ackerman (1996). According 
to Rose-Ackerman, democracy is the least corrupt form of 
government due to the fact that the need for reelection 
outweighs the short-term benefits that a politician could earn 
from corruption. She states that “the protection of civil liberties 
and free speech, which generally accompany democratic 
electoral processes, make open and transparent government 
possible” (Ackerman, 1996, p. 83). Because of this, corruption 
thrives more in an authoritarian or totalitarian regime than in 
democracy. The author also makes it clear that corruption in 
any form or case by a politician in a democratic state reduces 
the legitimacy of the democracy and the state. 
Warren (2004) claims that there are many different pathologies 
of politics, and the one that thrives the most in democracies is 
political corruption. This is different from the other literature 
surrounding this topic, as other literature points to political 
corruption not being able to thrive due to the institutions 
set up in a democracy. Warren even makes the statement 
that corruption in a democracy may have the potential to 
be beneficial, by “lowering transaction costs, reducing the 
inefficiencies of cumbersome rules, and generally making 
things happen” (Warren, 2004, p. 328).  Despite this, he 
does accept that corruption undermines the political culture 
that surrounds democracy, and can cause citizens to become 
cynical toward their government and its officials, whether or 
not each official has been proven to be corrupt or not.
According to Azfar, Lee, and Swamy (2001), citizens respond to 
the services that they are provided by public officials as what is 
referred to be a tip, or even a gift. In Western countries this may 
seem corrupt, but in their cultures it is normal and customary. 
The authors point out the necessity of defining corruption, due 
to the fact that the lines can be extremely blurry in what is or is 
not considered corruption. Among these blurry qualifications 
of corruption are at what point a tip or gift becomes a bribe 
and how campaign donations and financing can potentially 
be considered corruption, citing that in America, campaign 
donations serve the same roles and purposes that corruption 
may serve in other countries. 
Similar to Warren (2004), Azfar, Lee, and Swamy (2001) are able 
to recognize the potential benefits of low-levels of corruption in 
some states. They state that corruption has the possibility to be 
socially advantageous. They give the example of a government 
employee that doesn’t make much money and due to that, is 
unmotivated to effectively perform the work that they have to 
do. A small bribe—or tip, or gift—could potentially expedite 
the process and puts a bit of money in that employee’s pocket, 
and in that case makes it a beneficial situation. While that is 
a specific instance that by no means applies to the majority 
of corruption, it is important to be aware of the variety of 
purposes that corruption may play in the state. Even in this 
case, it does undermine democracy and unfairly favor those 
who have the money to pay a bribe. 
In total, the literature seems to emphasize the point that 
corruption ideally has no place in a democratic system. 
While there are small benefits that can occur on an individual 
basis from corruption, overall it tends to hurt the system. 
Corruption favors the rich and the poor are treated unfairly, 
therefore widening the economic income inequality gap and 
undermining the entire concept of democracy where everyone 
is equal and citizens’ best interests are served in government. 
Thus, our expectation is that we will find a negative relationship 
between corruption and democracy in our analysis of post-
Soviet Eastern European states.
Methods 
A helpful tool in analyzing the level of corruption that is 
present in countries across the world is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI is maintained and was created 
by Transparency International. The methodology is relatively 
simple; all countries are scored and ranked according to the 
same scale, focusing on corruption such as nepotism, bribery, 
and public office usage in order to gain privately. Country 
experts and business people score each country, based on set 
criteria, every four years (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017). 
The scoring process by Transparency International is as follows 
(2017):
“Standardise data sources to a scale of 0-100 where a 
0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 
100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption. This 
standardisation is done by subtracting the mean of each 
source in the baseline year from each country score and 
then dividing by the standard deviation of that source in 
the baseline year. This subtraction and division using the 
baseline year parameters ensures that the CPI scores are 
comparable year on year since 2012. After this procedure, 
the standardised scores are transformed to the CPI scale 
by multiplying with the value of the CPI standard deviation 
in 2012 (20) and adding the mean of CPI in 2012 (45), so 
that the data set fits the CPI’s 0-100 scale”.
After three sources assess each country, the average is 
calculated and a score is given, with lower values denoting 
more corruption while higher scores imply less corruption. 
According to the score that is given, the countries are ranked 
relative to one another. There are 180 countries that are ranked, 
therefore each country is given a ranking between 1 and 180.
Corruption and Democracy in Eastern Europe
Corruption is a problem that post-communist Eastern Europe 
has been dealing with for decades. Ever since the start of the 
fall of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, many of 
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those countries have had to work on their own democratic 
governmental systems. In the cases of Moldova, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Georgia, none of those countries are considered 
to be full democracies. Working toward a democratic system 
has proven difficult, in part because of the corruption that is 
present. Table 1 shows perceptions of corruption that were 
sourced from the Corruption Perception Index.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Eastern Europe 
is among the worst regions in the world for corruption with an 
average CPI score of 34 (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). 
Diamond (2008) also brings up the point that in most post-
Soviet countries, democracy is not the norm. Older generations 
were born during communism and authoritarianism; the Soviet 
Union was the only government they knew for a long time. 
Because of that, it’s difficult to establish strong democracy, 
especially because of the political culture of the people. 
He explains that due to the corruption of the Soviet Union, 
the citizens in post-Soviet countries have a general mistrust 
for the government. Democracy is difficult to maintain, and 
impossible to not have corruption undermine it in some way. 
Some degree of corruption can be seen in all post-communist 
Eastern European countries, particularly Moldova, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Georgia.  
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An indicator of the level of democracy of a country is the score 
that it is given from Freedom House. Higher values indicate 
a higher level of democracy, while lower values indicate a 
lower level of democracy. Table 2 shows the values given by 
Freedom House measuring democracy in Moldova, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Georgia from the years of 2014 to 2019.
The emphasis of this paper is on corruption in government and 
its relationship with democracy, so it is useful to compare the 
aggregate scores provided by Freedom House over time with 
each country and in relation to their CPI scores. The data from 
the CPI consists of the years 2013-2018, while the Freedom 
House scores are from 2014-2019. This is due to the fact that 
the CPI has not yet released their 2019 scores, and Freedom 
House does not have aggregate scores for countries before 
2014. The years were chosen in order for them to overlap as 
much as possible and while still providing six years of data. 
Moldova
The Republic of Moldova is a post-communist country that 
was at one time a part of the Soviet Union. Moldova declared 
its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union had begun, and continued to create its own constitution 
Table 1. Perceived Corruption in Eastern Europe
Country 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
Moldova 33 31 30 33 35 35
Ukraine 32 30 29 27 26 25
Belarus 44 44 40 32 31 29
Georgia 58 56 57 52 52 49
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index
Table 2  Freedom House Scores of  Eastern Europe
Country 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014
Moldova 58 61 62 60 63 64
Ukraine 60 62 61 61 62 55
Belarus 19 21 20 17 14 14
Georgia 63 64 64 64 64 63
Source: Freedom House
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Moldova is ranked low on the Corruption Perceptions Index 
with a score of 31, ranking 122nd out of 180 countries that 
were scored (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017). Unlike the 
other countries that will be discussed, Moldova’s score has 
been decreasing over time, holding a 36 in 2012 and a 31 in 
2017. Corruption is rampant there, and it could be concluded 
that because of that, their democracy has weakened. That 
low score is only second lowest to Ukraine, and is a few 
points lower than the average CPI score for Eastern Europe. 
Moldova’s Freedom House score has steadily decreased at a 
rate similar to its CPI, with a Freedom House score of 64 in 
2014 and 58 in 2019. Both scores have decreased around the 
same time, which indicates a relationship between corruption 
and democracy. Upon a correlation test from the years 2014-
2018 (as those are the years where there are both CPI and 
Freedom House values available), it was discovered that the R 
value of Moldova’s Corruption Perceptions Index and Freedom 
House scores is 0.811, indicating a strong positive correlation 
between levels of corruption and democracy.
Ukraine
Similar to Moldova, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. While 
Moldova has an extremely low score on corruption, according 
to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine is even lower 
(figure 2). With a score of 30 and a ranking of 130, it is clear 
that the country has some problems with corruption. Despite 
having a low score as of 2017, it is important to note that 
in comparison to past years for Ukraine, the score has been 
steadily increasing over the years. 
in 1994. Moldova was one of the only former Soviet Union 
countries that had some aspects of democracy right after the 
fall of the Soviet Union (Diamond, 2008). 
Despite being independent for a few decades, corruption 
remains normal in Moldova (figure 1). According to Freedom 
House, “Corruption remains a widespread problem at all 
levels of government, and existing anticorruption laws are 
inadequately enforced. In a report published in 2017, the 
National Anticorruption Center recorded a 23 percent increase 
in corruption cases in 2016 compared to 2015” (Freedom 
House, 2018).
Regarding the transparency of the government of Moldova, 
Freedom House also states that “the government does not 
operate with transparency. Most political activity takes place 
behind the scenes” (Freedom House, 2018). When such 
political activity is not permitted to be in the public eye, it is 
worrisome. Citizens are unable to be involved in the amount of 
politics in which they should be involved, and that is a problem 
when the country is working toward being a real democracy.
Moldova is riddled with economic crime and corruption. 
According to Lilia Carasciuc, the cause and baseline of this 
corruption is the “lack of control of state employees’ activity and 
a low enforcement rate, as a well as delays in the payment of 
wages for state workers” (Carasciuc, 1999, p. 128). When state 
employees are not monitored and are not held accountable for 
their actions, that is when corruption is able to run rampant and 
it is evident that this has occurred in Moldova. 
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Figure 1: Freedom House and CPI’s for Moldova.
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Corruption is one of Ukraine’s biggest problems and threats 
to democratic growth, so much so that the government—from 
pressure from external factors such as a desire for foreign 
investment—turned toward legislation to try to decrease it. 
In 2010, former Ukrainian President Yanukovych—who later 
was removed from power in 2014—proposed a law in order to 
decrease corruption (Hitch & Kuchma, 2011, p. 844). Despite 
efforts such as this, corruption has continued. 
Ukraine’s government actually puts surprisingly little effort into 
dealing with corruption. For example, in 2017, the National 
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine spearheaded a case against 
Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention due to 
allegations of extortion schemes (Freedom House, 2018). 
Dismissals and other shady business within Ukraine have even 
caused European Union officials to express concern about 
Ukraine’s corruption problem. Ukraine is improving according 
to their Corruption Perceptions Index score in recent years, 
but out of the four countries discussed in this paper, they have 
the lowest score and are well below the average CPI score for 
the region. According to the analysis and research, it would 
be surprising for Ukraine to make any substantial strides in the 
near future regarding corruption and democracy.
Unlike Moldova, their Freedom House score has been 
consistently increasing over the years, indicating improvement 
in their democracy. This steady increase in the Freedom House 
scores also correlates with a steady increase in CPI scores. Just 
like in the case with Moldova, the scores indicate a relationship 
between democracy and corruption. After a correlation test 
with the CPI and Freedom House scores for Ukraine from 
2014-2018, there is an R value of 0.646, indicating a positive 
correlation. This correlation is not as strong as the one seen 
with Moldova, but still strong enough to take note of. As 
Ukraine’s CPI score increases, indicating that corruption has 
gotten lower, the Freedom House score increases as well.
Belarus
Belarus, formally the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
has a higher CPI score than Moldova and Ukraine, but still 
has a low score compared to most of Europe (figure 3). Even 
though it is a low score compared to Europe as a whole, it is 
a relatively high score for Eastern Europe. As of 2017, Belarus 
has a score of 44. It is a bad score, but it isn’t as low as one 
might think for that country. It’s above the average of Eastern 
Europe, and has substantially increased, gaining 15 points in 
four years (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017).
Belarus is generally considered a dictatorship, as its president 
has been in power for 24 years and is currently in his fifth term 
in office (Besemeres, 2016). Belarus undeniably lacks a main 
feature of democracy: free, fair, and frequent elections. None 
were shocked when President Lukashenka emerged victorious 
in every election. President Lukashenka has had an interest 
in the European Union, and in order to achieve some credit 
with them and potentially get some financial backing, he 
worked to disguise the presidential election and campaigns 
to appear legitimate. This fell apart when, during a political 
demonstration against the regime, the members of his security 
forces beat up and arrested hundreds of citizens, truly showing 
the corrupt nature of the government system and how far it 
really was from being a democracy (Besemeres, 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, with a lack of democratic accountability and 
institutions in place comes large amounts of corruption. 
Corruption is only further fed by the fact that the vast 
majority of the economy and the media is controlled by the 
government, that there is no accountability or transparency 
within the government, and there aren’t bodies in place to 
investigate and bring forth corruption cases (Freedom House, 
2018). It’s clear that Belarus is not making the same kind of 
strides toward minimizing corruption and becoming a true 
democracy that many Eastern European countries are. 
Belarus was given extremely low scores from Freedom House, 
but they have been gradually improving, similar to their 
CPI scores. As seen in the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, 
the Freedom House and CPI scores for Belarus indicate a 
relationship between democracy and corruption, as they 
increase together and decrease together. As for Belarus’s 
correlation test for the years of 2014-2018 between the CPI 
and Freedom House scores, there is an R value of 0.974, 
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Figure 3: Freedom House and CPI’s for Belarus.
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suggesting an extremely strong positive correlation and 
relationship between corruption and democracy in Belarus.
Georgia
While Georgia is by no means a healthy democracy, it is by 
far the least corrupt country out of the sample chosen for this 
analysis (figure 4). With a 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index 
score of 56—a large leap from its score of 49 in 2013, and 
over 20 points above the Eastern European regional average 
score—it’s clear that the government is consciously making 
strides toward removing corruption. There has been quite a 
bit of progress against petty corruption, but there are not the 
high levels of enforcement of anticorruption measures that the 
country needs (Freedom House, 2018). 
Georgia has free, fair, and frequent elections for the most part, 
and is working toward making changes to their constitution 
that will help increase their electoral systems. It could be 
predicted, based on the information that is given, that 
Georgia will continue improving. According to the road that 
Georgia is on, it will most likely become a stronger democracy 
as time goes on, and corruption will continue to diminish. The 
corruption in place can definitely hinder the democracy, but 
Georgia is making conscious anti-corruption efforts in order to 
prevent this as much as possible.
For Georgia, while their CPI score has increased from 2012 to 
2017, their Freedom House score has stayed very constant at 
a score of 63 or 64 from 2014 to 2019. This doesn’t indicate a 
relationship or correlation between corruption and democracy 
like the other countries discussed, but does not indicate a lack 
of a relationship either. In regards to Georgia’s correlation test 
between CPI and Freedom House scores over 2014-2018, it 
has the weakest correlation out of the countries included in this 
study with an R value of 0.593, which still indicates a positive 
correlation.
Conclusion
After analysis and research on corruption and the role that it 
plays in democracy and in former Soviet Eastern European 
countries, it is clear that corruption has no place in a democracy. 
Based on the research that has been done and comparing the 
CPI scores and Freedom House scores, it is obvious that there 
is a positive correlation between democracy and corruption. 
This correlation is clear when looking at the scores for Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Belarus. Corruption and democracy do not act 
independently and they do affect each other, which is indicated 
by the positive correlation in CPI and Freedom House scores. 
All four countries had an R value on the correlation test that 
indicated there was a notable correlation between corruption 
and democracy.
Due to the fact that the entire claim of democracy is that it is 
a government for the people by the people, it is not fair nor 
morally correct for politicians and government officials to take 
advantage of the system for their own personal gain. When 
corrupt government officials only look out for themselves, there 
is a lot that the country—and its citizenry—has to lose. Every 
country has a different way to deal with corruption and has to 
find a method of keeping their officials accountable that works 
for them. Corruption doesn’t only affect the people directly 
tied to it; it hurts the entire political system in some way, and 
can hurt many people indirectly. Corruption undermines efforts 
that countries make to democratize.















Freedom House Corruption Perceptions Index
Figure 4: Freedom House and CPI’s for Georgia.
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